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“‘MALE CHAUVINISM’ IS UNDER ATTACK FROM
ALL SIDES AT PRESENT”: ROBERTS V. UNITED
STATES JAYCEES, SEX DISCRIMINATION,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Linda C. McClain*
INTRODUCTION
The connection between gender equality and the First Amendment brings
to mind potent imagery about twentieth-century constitutional interpretation.
In the late 1980s, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained that, well into
the twentieth century, “except for the franchise[,] . . . the Constitution
remained an empty cupboard for people seeking to promote the equal status
and stature of men and women under the law.”1 Ginsburg observed that the
Warren Court, in 1960s cases such as Hoyt v. Florida,2 “held the baseline set
by the Supreme Court in the 1870s”3 in Bradwell v. Illinois.4 Bradwell
includes Justice Joseph P. Bradley’s infamous concurring opinion where he
appealed to “divine ordinance” and “the nature of things” to explain man’s
role as “woman’s protector and defender” and woman’s “destiny and
mission . . . [to be] wife and mother” rather than hold “occupations of civil
life,” such as the practice of law.5 Upholding a Florida law that granted only
women an absolute exemption from jury service, Hoyt noted “the enlightened
emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone
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1. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 LAW
& INEQUALITY 17, 18 (1988).
2. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
3. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 19.
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
5. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
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years” but asserted that “woman is still regarded as the center of home and
family life.”6
The Court’s approach to the Equal Protection Clause began to change in
1971 when the “conservative” Burger Court took the “modestly
revolutionary” step of critically examining and striking down gender-based
classifications.7 As a pioneering litigator, Ginsburg played a key role in the
familiar story of this new, generative power of the Equal Protection Clause:
her efforts led to the Court’s adoption of the intermediate scrutiny test to
dismantle discriminatory laws based on archaic and overbroad stereotypes
about the “relative needs and capacities of the sexes.”8
Does an “empty cupboard” aptly capture the First Amendment as a
resource for advancing “the equal status and stature of men and women under
the law”?9 Or does a more troubling picture apply: that, as historically
interpreted, the First Amendment has been a roadblock to gender equality?
Certainly, some have lodged this critique of First Amendment jurisprudence
concerning freedom of speech. Ninety years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., in dissent, asserted the imperative of “attachment” to the
constitutional principle of “free thought—not . . . for those who agree with
us, but freedom for the thought that we hate,” which subsequently became a
frequent justification for protecting hateful speech.10 In 2017, after
observing that “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful,” Justice Alito
quoted Justice Holmes: “The proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence
is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”11
Over thirty years ago, in American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut,12 Judge
Frank Easterbrook similarly appealed to the First Amendment’s distinctive
protection of an absolute right to “propagate” even hateful opinions, as he
struck down an Indianapolis anti-pornography civil rights ordinance drafted
by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.13 In words that still startle
for their almost perverse delight in conceding the costs of First Amendment
absolutism and protecting hateful speech, Judge Easterbrook accepted the
legislation’s premise—that “depictions of subordination [of women] tend to
perpetuate subordination,” which leads to many negative consequences in
6. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61–62.
7. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 18–19.
8. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (describing the Court’s historical application of the Equal Protection
Clause); Wendy W. Williams, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Equal Protection Clause: 1970–80, 25
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41, 41–43 (2013). This “gender revolution” in constitutional law
impacts the story told in this Article, but is not its primary focus.
9. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 18.
10. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (quoting Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 655
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). The Court held unconstitutional the Patent and Trademark Office’s
refusal to register “The Slants” as a band’s trademark, finding that the term might be seen as
demeaning to Asian Americans. Id. The band’s evident aim was to “reclaim” the slur and help
“drain its denigrating force.” Id. at 1751.
12. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 328.
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women’s daily lives in the home, at work, and “on the streets.”14 But, he
insisted, “this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech.”15
Such speech is protected, just as are “racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence
on television, [and] reporter’s biases,” which influence society and generally
can only be rebutted by other speech in “the popular culture.”16 Any other
approach would make government the “great censor and director of which
thoughts are good for us.”17 To be sure, some feminists who opposed the
ordinance warned of governmental censorship and asserted that women’s
freedom and equality require robust protection of speech.18 Today, feminist
legal scholars and activists attempt to navigate regulation of hateful online
speech and activity without running into the roadblock of hallowed First
Amendment protection for “the thought that we hate.”19
Still yet, consider the First Amendment as “the proverbial double-edged
sword.”20 Privacy scholar Anita Allen finds that First Amendment privacy
doctrines concerning associational privacy (or freedom of association) and
“privacies of religion, thought, and intellect”21 have been used both to
advocate for “progressively liberal social change”22 and to preserve “social
stasis” and oppose government “interfer[ence] with traditional practices
merely for the sake of progressive ideas about marriage, family, social life,
Whether used by progressive liberals or social
or citizenship.”23
conservatives, First Amendment privacy doctrines prove “an attractive but
perilous weapon.”24
This Article considers the relationship between gender equality and
freedom of association. Freedom of association has a complex relationship
to the important goals of furthering gender equality and nondiscrimination.
As I have argued elsewhere, freedom of association—freedom to join and
14. Id. at 328–29.
15. Id. at 329.
16. Id. at 330.
17. Id. Challenging these premises falls outside the scope of this Article, but, arguably,
recent neuroscience studies demonstrating a link between hateful and dehumanizing speech
about out-groups and prejudice and lack of empathy might warrant reconsideration of this
“absolute right,” particularly as exercised on the internet and in politics. See Richard A.
Friedman, The Neuroscience of Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/opinion/caravan-hate-speech-bowers-sayoc.html
[http://perma.cc/8FUL-ZFTK].
18. Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al., American
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-3147), reprinted in SEX,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 199, 210–11 (Lori Gruen & George E. Panichas eds., 1997)
(recognizing that “freedom and socially recognized space” for the “range of feminist
imagination and expression in the realm of sexuality [that] has begun to find voice” would be
at risk from laws like the ordinance, which constrict freedom of speech).
19. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).
20. Anita L. Allen, First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal
Social Change, 14 J. CONST. L. 885, 887 (2012).
21. Id. at 886.
22. Id. at 900.
23. Id. at 886. Allen focuses on First Amendment privacy doctrines, including
“associational privacy” and “privacies of religion, thought, and intellect.” Id.
24. Id.
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participate in the myriad groups of civil society—“contributes to liberal
democracy by affording oppositional space to ‘enclaves of protected
discourse and action,’ which allows social actors to seek to correct injustices
by bringing about change.”25 Freedom of association protects spaces in civil
society in which members of groups may challenge an unjust status quo and
also find mutual support. For example, historical and modern women’s
organizations played and continue to play an important role in the gender
equality movement.26
Although not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment, freedom of
association underlies and facilitates enumerated First Amendment rights:
freedom of speech, the free exercise of religion, and freedom of assembly.27
Freedom of association has a complex relationship with securing free and
equal citizenship and, particularly, gender equality. It is indeed doubleedged, as illustrated by Roberts v. United States Jaycees.28 In Jaycees, even
as the Court elaborated upon the values advanced by the freedom of
association, it upheld the application of Minnesota’s public accommodations
law to the U.S. Jaycees’s exclusion of women from regular membership
despite the Jaycees’s freedom of speech and association claims.29 In doing
so, it affirmed the state’s compelling interest in preventing the distinct harms
of invidious discrimination in “the distribution of publicly available goods,
services, and other advantages.”30 Both aspects of Jaycees live on: in party
briefs and judicial rulings, it is a frequent reference for the First
Amendment’s protection of freedom of association and for the state’s
compelling interest in prohibiting invidious discrimination, even in the face
of First Amendment claims.31 Jaycees has been criticized by both
conservative and liberal political and legal theorists, who argue that the Court
insufficiently protected the Jaycees’s associational rights at the expense of

25. JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY:
RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 111 (2013) (quoting Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting
Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
POLITICAL 46, 58 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)).
26. See, e.g., PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK
WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 94–117 (1984) (describing efforts of the Black
women’s club movement, the National Association of Club Women); Claudia Center, “Boys
Keep Out!”: Historical and Legal Perspectives on the Contributions of All-Female
Organizations to Sex Equality, 8 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 1–3 (1992) (discussing the nineteenthcentury women’s club movement and twentieth-century efforts).
27. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1957).
28. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
29. Id. at 622–23.
30. Id. at 628.
31. Curiously, however, legal scholars have comparatively neglected Jaycees, as
measured by the cases that find their way into the various collections of “law stories” or
“rewritten opinions” projects. It is not included in any of West’s “Law Stories,” including
those for which it seems a good candidate (for example, the volumes on civil rights,
constitutional law, First Amendment, and women and the law). Similarly, Cambridge
University Press’s “Feminist Judgments” series of rewritten U.S. Supreme Court opinions has
not included it so far.
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constitutional democracy and pluralism and overestimated the impact of the
Jaycees’s membership policies on women’s equal citizenship.32
Many take it for granted that, today, discriminating against women as
women in the marketplace is illegal and morally wrong. Studying the Jaycees
litigation over the reach of public accommodations law reveals parties
wrestling over that reach and over the force of the race-sex analogy. One
striking contrast is the different ways that the parties and their amici invoked
NAACP v. Alabama33 and compared or contrasted the NAACP and the
Jaycees.
Part I begins with the Supreme Court’s recognition of the freedom of
association as first articulated in NAACP v. Alabama. It shows how, in the
context of race discrimination, some key civil rights victories have enlisted
claims of the freedom of association, while some other victories have
prevailed against such claims. Those precedents set the foundation for the
Court’s decision in Jaycees, which concerned gender discrimination. Part II
focuses on the role of Jaycees in drawing an analogy between the harms of
gender discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination and on the limits
of freedom of association claims in both contexts. It highlights how parties
and amici in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission34 relied on Jaycees to connect race and sex discrimination to
sexual-orientation discrimination.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the
petitioner—a baker who refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex
couple—argued that the application of Colorado’s public accommodations
law to him violated his right to free exercise of religion and impermissibly
compelled his creative expression.35 I focus in particular on the arguments
made by the National Women’s Law Center, an amicus in support of the
respondents. Part III returns to Jaycees and examines the arguments made
by the parties and their amici regarding the evident conflict between
promoting sex equality—women’s full participation in society—and
protecting freedom of association. What was at stake for women in being
excluded from full membership in organizations, like the Jaycees and allmale private clubs, that provided members “an entree to the ‘Old Boys
Network’”?36 What was at stake for the Jaycees and similar organizations in
a climate in which (as one amicus put it) “‘Male chauvinism’ is under attack
from all sides”?37

32. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of
Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 (2010); George Kateb, The Value of Association, in
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 60–61 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). See generally Nancy
Rosenblum, Compelled Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra, at 75.
33. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
34. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
35. Id. at 1726.
36. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Organization for Women et al. in Support of
Reversal, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 226, at *19 [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW].
37. Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 236, at *36.
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Part IV briefly returns to the present day and asks whether the old boys
network that presented such a vexing barrier to women’s economic and
career mobility is simply a relic of the past or has continuing potency. Part
IV concludes by comparing some present-day controversies over freedom of
association and gender equality to those fought out in Jaycees.
I. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION VERSUS FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION:
NAACP V. ALABAMA AND JAYCEES
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the freedom of association in
NAACP v. Alabama, which powerfully exemplifies the importance of
protecting space for challenging the status quo. In the late 1950s, the
NAACP successfully challenged an Alabama law that would have required
disclosure of its rank-and-file membership list.38 Doing so would have
exposed its members to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”39 Protecting
the group’s membership list meant that African American members could
create community, organize, and strategize without fear of reprisal simply for
belonging to the NAACP.40
On the other hand, some key civil rights victories have involved prevailing
against freedom of association claims. Two famous examples in the context
of race discrimination are Norwood v. Harrison41 and Runyon v. McCrary.42
In Norwood, the Court held that Mississippi could not provide textbooks to
“virtually all white” private schools that racially discriminated. In oftenquoted language, it stated: “Although the Constitution does not proscribe
private bias, it places no value on discrimination . . . . Invidious private
discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of
association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded
affirmative constitutional protection.”43 In Runyon, the Court held that
applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in
contracts, to white-only private schools did not violate parents’ or children’s
freedom of association.44 Echoing Norwood, the Court explained that
NAACP v. Alabama’s principle that freedom of association protects
“effective advocacy of [controversial] public and private points of view”45

38. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
39. Id. at 462.
40. See Allen, supra note 20, at 902 (describing NAACP v. Alabama as “an important
precedent available to other African Americans stymied by threats, intimidation, and
opportunistic applications of state law”). To my knowledge, there is no precise counterpart to
NAACP v. Alabama with respect to gender equality. I have not been able to find a case in
which the Court protected the associational freedom of an organization dedicated to advancing
gender equality against a state law threatening it in some way.
41. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
42. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
43. Norwood, 413 U.S. at 457, 469–70.
44. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168, 175–76.
45. Id. at 175 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
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does not extend to “the practice of excluding racial minorities” from
educational institutions.46
In the context of gender equality, Jaycees is a key example of when
freedom of association claims did not defeat governmental efforts to end
discrimination. The Court cited NAACP v. Alabama in elaborating the First
Amendment’s protection of freedom of association for purposes of political
expression but concluded that, although some of the Jaycees’s activities
implicated this right, it was not an “absolute” right and could be infringed to
“serve compelling state interests.”47 Citing Runyon, the Court stated that
even if Minnesota’s law “incidental[ly] abridge[d]” the Jaycees’s protected
speech, its discriminatory membership practices were not constitutionally
protected.48
The Court directly analogized the effects of sex-based discrimination to
those of race-based discrimination. The Court reaffirmed that the
“fundamental object” of Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964 “was to vindicate
‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal
access to public establishments.’”49 The Jaycees Court added: “That
stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis
of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.”50
Jaycees provided the analytical framework for the Court, later in the
1980s, to uphold the application of state or municipal public
accommodations laws prohibiting gender discrimination to large businessoriented men’s associations, despite claims of freedom of association.51
Decades later, it remains a staple in arguments that state antidiscrimination
laws reflect the government’s compelling interest in ending invidious
discrimination.
Conversely, some nongovernmental groups have
successfully enlisted Jaycees to dispute that governmental interest or the
proper reach of state public accommodations laws.52
II. THE PLACE OF JAYCEES IN THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP LITIGATION
Jaycees reasons by analogizing different forms of discrimination. Such
arguments appeared in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
46. Id. at 176; see Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470.
47. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1984).
48. Id. at 628.
49. Id. at 625 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250
(1964)). In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court upheld Title II, the public
accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against a myriad of constitutional
claims (although not a freedom of association one) brought by a motel operator. 379 U.S. 241,
244, 258–62 (1964) (detailing and rejecting the motel operator’s Article I, Fifth Amendment,
and Thirteenth Amendment claims).
50. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625.
51. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1988); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987) (“[Jaycees] provides
the framework for analyzing the appellants’ constitutional claims.”).
52. See generally, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).

2392

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Commission, in which petitioner Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece
Cakeshop, argued that compelling him to bake a wedding cake for a samesex couple, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, violated his free exercise of
religion and compelled his creative expression.53
In defending the application of Colorado’s public accommodations law
against Phillips, the respondents—Craig, Mullins, and the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission (CCRC)—and their amici enlisted Jaycees to argue that,
just as the Court there compared the evils of race discrimination to those of
sex discrimination, the Court here should compare the harms of race and sex
discrimination to those of sexual-orientation discrimination. As amici, the
National Women’s Law Center (NWLC) and thirty-nine additional
organizations made that argument but also discussed the importance of public
accommodations law for fostering gender equality itself.54 The NWLC
asserted that, if the Court accepted Phillips’s First Amendment arguments, it
would undermine such laws both for women and for other protected groups.55
The NWLC’s amicus brief provides a doorway for this Article’s
consideration of the relationship between gender equality and the First
Amendment and the tensions around the freedom of association.
A. From Race to Sex to Sexual Orientation: The Government’s Interest
in Ending Discrimination
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, nearly 100 amicus briefs
offered various arguments concerning whether the application of the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) to Phillips’s refusal to create a
wedding cake for Craig and Mullins, on the basis of his sincere religious
beliefs about marriage, violated his First Amendment rights to the free
exercise of religion or freedom of speech.56 Hotly contested in the numerous
briefs was whether there was an appropriate analogy between refusals of
service based on a customer’s race and refusals based on a customer’s
intended marriage partner.57 Was there, as respondents and their amici
53. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1726
(2018).
54. Brief of the National Women’s Law Center and Other Groups as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 1–6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111)
[hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae of the NWLC] (describing the thirty-nine organizations as
“committed to obtaining economic security and equality for women”).
55. Id. at 16–22, 32–38.
56. See No. 16-111, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?
filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/16-111.html [https://perma.cc/6JAJ-YGJF] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2019). By my count, there were forty-five amicus briefs filed in support of
petitioner, forty-six in support of respondents, and four in support of neither party—or ninetyfive in all. See id. Phillips did not make a freedom of association argument. See generally
Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
57. Compare Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in
Support of Respondents at 2–3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (drawing
a direct parallel between the denial of service by Phillips to Craig, Mullins, and Mullins’s
mother and the denial of service at a barbeque to three African American customers in
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam)), with Brief of Amici
Curiae Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. in
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argued, a similar deprivation of dignity when the basis of discrimination was
sexual orientation, and was the governmental interest as compelling? Or, as
an amicus for Phillips argued, were the concerns that motivated Title II
simply “not present here”?58 In defending CADA, the respondents and their
amici enlisted Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,59 along with
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.60 In Newman, the Court characterized
as “patently frivolous” an objection by a white restaurant owner that Title II
violated his free exercise of religion by compelling him to serve Black
customers, contrary to his religious beliefs about segregation.61
The race-discrimination analogy, however, was not the only one invoked
to support CADA. In upholding CADA’s application to Phillips, the
Colorado Court of Appeals cited Jaycees along with race-discrimination
precedents when it observed, “The Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that states have a compelling interest in eliminating such
discrimination and that statutes like CADA further that interest.”62 Before
the U.S. Supreme Court, Craig, Mullins, and the CCRC enlisted Jaycees to
support their argument that CADA was constitutional given the
government’s “compelling interest”63 in preventing the “unique evils”
caused by acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly
available goods, services, and other advantages.64
Their amicus, the NWLC, described Jaycees as a “lodestar case,” in which
the Court held that the Jaycees’s objections to admitting women to full
membership did not prevail against the state’s interest in preventing
discrimination in “the public marketplace.”65 The brief argued that the
state’s interest was equally compelling in preventing discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity and that the Court should reject the
Department of Justice’s contention in their amicus brief that race
discrimination presented a special case.66 The NWLC brief also sought to
explain why ending pervasive discrimination against women in public
accommodations in the marketplace was “fundamental” to women’s equality
Support of Petitioners at 27–28, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing
that “[t]here is no LGBT analog here to the Piggie Park case” because there is no “bare refusal
to serve LGBT customers”).
58. Brief for the States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (“Public-accommodations concerns of
past eras are not present here . . . .”).
59. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
60. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 402 n.5; see Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, supra note 57, at 13.
62. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 2015), rev’d,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719.
63. Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission at 23, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628
(1984)).
64. Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 37–39, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628).
65. Brief Amici Curiae of the NWLC, supra note 54, at 18.
66. Id. at 5.
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and to women’s full participation in a free and equal society.67 The brief
argued that as state public accommodations laws expanded to include “sex”
they helped to remove barriers to such full participation.68 But, offering
various real and hypothetical examples of refusals of goods, services, and
employment opportunities, motivated by beliefs about women’s proper roles,
the brief cautioned that if the Court allowed the First Amendment to be a
shield for sex discrimination by adopting expansive exemptions from such
state laws, it could roll back such progress.69 In other words, the brief made
sex discrimination not merely of historical interest, but a live concern.
B. The Opinion: The Invisibility of Sex Discrimination
In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s fifth and final majority opinion concerning
the constitutional and civil rights of LGBT persons,70 the Court’s decision in
Masterpiece Cakeshop seemed both to accept and express caution about the
race analogy. The Court ultimately reversed the Colorado Court of Appeals
because the CCRC showed hostility toward and “disparaged” Phillips’s
religious beliefs and revealed its bias by analogizing his beliefs to religious
defenses of slavery and characterizing his invocation of freedom of religion
as a “despicable piece[] of rhetoric” to justify discrimination.71 On the one
hand, Kennedy stated, “The religious and philosophical objections to gay
marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of
expression.”72 On the other hand, Kennedy cited Piggie Park in explaining
the “general rule” that acting on such objections was a different matter:
Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are
protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally
applicable public accommodations law.73

Joined by Justice Breyer in her concurrence, Justice Kagan read Piggie
Park as illustrating the Court’s longstanding jurisprudence that “a vendor
cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion disapproves
selling a product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual
orientation, race, sex, or other protected trait.”74 Justice Kagan’s inclusion
of “sex” in this list warrants comment. Title II does not include “sex.”
Rather, Title II’s four prohibited categories are race, color, religion, and

67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 11–13.
69. Id. at 22, 32–36.
70. I should make clear that Justice Kennedy never used the acronym “LGBT” in these
opinions; in Masterpiece Cakeshop, he refers to “gay persons” and “gay couples.”
71. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1721, 1729
(2018).
72. Id. at 1727.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring).
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national origin. By comparison, most state public accommodations laws
have expanded beyond such categories to include “sex.”75
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy observed that Colorado adopted
a public accommodations law in 1885 that guaranteed “‘full and equal
enjoyment’ of certain public facilities to ‘all citizens,’ ‘regardless of race,
color or previous condition of servitude.’”76 Kennedy noted that, in 2007
and 2008, CADA was amended to add “sexual orientation” to the list of
protected characteristics.77 He skipped over when “sex” was added to the
list, but NWLC’s brief filled in that blank, citing a 1969 amendment that
added “sex” as a protected characteristic.78 Evidently, Colorado was the first
state to do so.79
In Jaycees, the Supreme Court noted that Minnesota prohibited sex
discrimination in 1973, nearly a century after it first adopted a statute
prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations.80 By enlisting
Piggie Park as affirming a vendor’s general obligation to provide goods and
services despite religious or other objections, both Kennedy and Kagan
indicated the common, legitimate concerns of federal and state public
accommodations law, despite the broader and evolving reach of the latter.
III. THE JAYCEES LITIGATION
In Jaycees, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether
Minnesota reached too far in applying its relatively recent prohibition of sex
discrimination in public accommodations to the Jaycees’s two-tiered
membership practices. Young men between the ages of eighteen and thirtyfive were eligible for full membership in the Jaycees; women and older men
could be “associate members” who paid lower dues but could not “vote, hold
local or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and
awards programs.”81 Since the Jaycees defended this membership structure
as necessary for its purposes, it bears quoting them. Founded as the Junior
Chamber of Commerce in 1920, the Jaycees’s objective, as stated in its
bylaws, was to pursue
such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the
growth and development of young men’s civic organizations in the United
States, designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such
75. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 636 n.17 (2016).
76. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725 (quoting 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws 132–33).
77. Id.
78. Brief Amici Curiae of the NWLC, supra note 54, at 12.
79. Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 27), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3344715
[https://perma.cc/7HRK-PZDH].
80. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (explaining that such nineteenthcentury state laws were in response to the Court’s 1883 opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), which invalidated a federal public accommodations statute (the Civil Rights
Act of 1875), but noted the existence of state public accommodations laws that imposed “a
variety of equal access obligations”).
81. Id. at 613.

2396

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civil interest, and as a
supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for
personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent
participation by young men in the affairs of their community, state and
nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young men
of all nations.82

Contrary to established policies, two local Minnesota chapters in
Minneapolis and St. Paul admitted women as full members.83 Faced with
sanctions and the threat of charter revocation by U.S. Jaycees—the
organization’s national body—the chapters filed charges of discrimination
with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, arguing the sanctions
imposed by the national body violated Minnesota’s public accommodations
law.84 In turn, U.S. Jaycees brought a federal lawsuit to prevent enforcement
of the public accommodations law against the Jaycees, asserting First
Amendment rights to free speech and association.85 The federal district court
in Minnesota ruled that Minnesota could apply its law to the Jaycees, but the
Eighth Circuit reversed.86
Compared to the thousands of pages of arguments contributed by the
parties and their numerous amici in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the amicus briefs
filed in Jaycees form a modest pile. Eight amicus briefs filed on behalf of
Roberts, the acting Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights, urged the Supreme Court to reverse the decision of the Eighth
Circuit.87 Three amicus briefs filed on behalf of the Jaycees urged the
Supreme Court to affirm.88 This Part compares arguments about the
following questions: (1) Are the Jaycees just like the NAACP, and does an
organization’s purpose matter to whether it has a First Amendment right to
freedom of association? (2) Are women excluded from full membership in
the Jaycees like racial minorities excluded from all-white groups or spaces,
and does a state have a similarly compelling interest in ending both forms of
exclusion? (3) What would be the effects of a ruling requiring the Jaycees to
change its membership policies, and what are the implications for other
associations? To allude to this Article’s title, was “male chauvinism” indeed
under attack as the Jaycees defended the legitimacy of devoting itself to
advancing “the interests of young men only”?89

82. Id. at 612–13.
83. Id. at 614.
84. Id. at 614–15.
85. Id. at 615.
86. U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Minn. 1982), rev’d, 709 F.2d
1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
87. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 611 n.*.
88. See id.
89. See infra Part III.C.2–3.

2019]

MALE CHAUVINISM UNDER ATTACK

2397

A. Are the Jaycees Just Like the NAACP and Does It Matter for Purposes
of the Reach of the Freedom of Association?
Both sides recognized the importance of NAACP v. Alabama but employed
it in strikingly different ways. The Jaycees and their amici drew parallels
between the Jaycees and the NAACP, arguing that, in both instances, public
hostility toward an organization’s purposes fortified the need for First
Amendment protection. Minnesota and its amici rejected such parallels
between an organization fighting race discrimination and one engaging in sex
discrimination. They warned against turning freedom of association from a
shield for political dissent into a sword.
1. Appellees and Their Amici: The Jaycees and the NAACP Are Similar
Both the Jaycees and Rotary International—a male-only club that filed an
amicus brief supporting the Jaycees’s position—insisted that the Jaycees
were in a similar position to that of the NAACP in the 1950s, when the Court
held that mandating disclosure of the NAACP’s membership list in Alabama
would infringe its constitutional freedom of association.90 The Jaycees and
Rotary compared the present hostility toward their men-only membership
rules to that exhibited toward the NAACP in the 1950s. In doing so, Rotary
insisted that freedom of association does not hinge on societal perceptions of
a group’s positions:
At the present time, male-only organizations such as the Jaycees and Rotary
are encountering governmental and social hostility akin to that directed at
the NAACP in the 1960’s. However, it will not do to assert that because
the male versus female discrimination practiced by such organizations is
perceived as wicked, it is undeserving of constitutional protection. The
First Amendment is both color-blind and gender-blind. Freedom of
association and the other rights protected by that amendment are protected
whether the group invoking the Constitution is perceived as “good” or
“bad,” “right” or “wrong.” Constitutional liberties are guarded regardless
of whose ox is being gored.91

The Rotary brief did not stop with this historical comparison. It suggested
that the NAACP remained unpopular. In contesting the appellees’ argument
that invidious discrimination does not deserve First Amendment protection,
Rotary suggested that the NAACP itself took invidious positions:
The aggressive policies of the NAACP on behalf of blacks have assuredly
caused discontent, animosity, and, in the case of affirmative action
programs, envy among many white Americans. But the fact that the
NAACP restricts its activities to the advancement of the cause of blacks
has not caused it to lose its First Amendment right.92

90. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 339, 446 (1958).
91. Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International, supra note 37, at *26–27.
92. Id. at *26 (citing the dictionary definition of “invidious” as “tending to cause
discontent, animosity, or envy”).
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Rotary argued that, absent the unpopularity of the NAACP’s positions, the
Court would not have recognized their rights as requiring protection.93 The
Jaycees enlisted NAACP v. Alabama to argue that its socially disfavored
purpose—promoting the interests of young men—should not affect its First
Amendment rights.94
So too, Rotary reasoned, the perception of “men-only organizations” as
part and parcel of “male chauvinism” should not rob them of First
Amendment protection:
The Court may take judicial notice that “male chauvinism” is under attack
from all sides at present. Defense of men-only organizations is not popular,
and even the ACLU, famed for its defense of the rights of the American
Nazi Party, has seen fit to join the women in the attack against the Jaycees.
The climate of the times may be on the side of “equal rights.” But if the
precious freedoms protected by the First Amendment may be swept away
whenever one of those is involved in an unpopular cause, then this great
land is further down the road to a fictional 1984 than most of its citizens
would wish to travel.95

Rotary’s argument resembles the premise that the First Amendment protects
expressing “the thought that we hate.”96
The Jaycees denied that they practiced “invidious” discrimination, and
they objected to appellants’ invocation of discrimination precedents like
Runyon v. McCrary: “The use of this term [invidious discrimination] is
apparently intended to suggest that the Jaycees all-male membership policy
is somehow immoral and unsavory and therefore not entitled to protection
against the State’s police powers.”97 In striking language that prefigures
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in United States v. Windsor,98 the Jaycees
spoke of the attempted analogies between sex and race as “attempts to tar the
Jaycees with the brush of ‘invidious discrimination’” and asserted that that
race-discrimination context does not apply to the Jaycees’s “benign
policy.”99

93. Id.
94. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237, at *22–23 (“The fact that the
Jaycees’ central purpose may not, in this period of history, appear as important as that of the
NAACP provides no invitation to state power. Justice Harlan stated in NAACP v. Alabama
that the nature of the beliefs sought to be advanced by association was ‘immaterial.’”).
95. Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International, supra note 37, at *36. In support, Rotary
enlists NAACP v. Button, in which Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. criticized “selective
enforcement” of “vague and broad” statutes “against unpopular causes.” Id. (quoting NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963)).
96. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
97. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, supra note 94, at *23.
98. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
99. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, supra note 94, at *25. Compare id., with
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I would not tar the political branches
with the brush of bigotry.”).
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2. Appellants: The NAACP and the Jaycees Are Different—Freedom of
Association Is a Shield, Not a Sword
The appellants and their amici vehemently resisted the Jaycees comparing
itself to the NAACP and enlisting NAACP v. Alabama to defend its
membership practices, would turn freedom of association into a sword, not a
shield. Appellants countered that Runyon was the more apt precedent: “The
Jaycees’ claim that freedom of association protects its denial of equal access
to women should be rejected on the same basis that this Court rejected the
claim of parents in [Runyon] that associational freedom insulated their
racially motivated practice of denying educational opportunities to black
children.”100 In effect, the Jaycees were more like the segregationist groups
the NAACP and other civil rights groups challenged.
Appellants and their amici strenuously disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s
ruling that requiring the Jaycees to admit women to full membership would
impair the First Amendment rights of its members. The National
Organization for Women (NOW) and other feminist groups argued that
NAACP v. Alabama held that “[f]or group activity to be protected, it must
embody appropriate First Amendment content.”101 Thus, “[t]he Jaycees does
not enjoy a constitutional shield for its discriminatory practices simply
because its members have joined together to hone their career skills, provide
themselves with civic exposure, and enhance their opportunities in the
business world.”102
Appellants insisted that NAACP v. Alabama showed that the Court had not
recognized freedom of association as an independent First Amendment right
but instead as a derivative right necessary to protect enumerated First
Amendment rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.103
The Court protected that derivative right because compelling the NAACP to
disclose its membership lists would “chill or impede the NAACP’s exercise
of free speech and assembly” in “an atmosphere of racial animosity,” where
members “faced economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”104 The Jaycees faced
no such threat to an enumerated right.105
The National League of Cities elaborated on this lack of threat, stressing
the Jaycees’s comparative popularity:
[M]embers of unpopular groups [like the NAACP] were threatened with
devastating retaliation if their names or affiliations were revealed pursuant
to state law. Such retaliation would have made it impossible for the
members to continue to associate with the groups or advocate the groups’
beliefs. . . .
100. Appellants’ Brief, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 227, at *34.
101. Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW, supra note 36, at *33–34.
102. Id. at *34.
103. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *29–31.
104. Id. at *27–28.
105. Id. at *30–31.
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[The present case] concerns an enormously popular group, which has a
huge membership predominantly comprised of employees and leaders of
the powerful American business community. The prospect that the
regulation at issue will lead to retaliation against the Jaycees or its members
is nil. The threat to a right to associate with the group or advocate its
positions is correspondingly nil.106

In distinguishing NAACP v. Alabama, the ACLU argued that the purpose of
freedom of association was to preserve diversity by protecting minority and
dissident expression and advocacy from “suppression by the powerful.”107 It
warned that an “unbounded freedom to dis-associate would cripple the
guarantees of equality contained in the Constitution and our Civil Rights
statutes, since every ban on discrimination would be checkmated by an
assertion of individual autonomy phrased as a claim of associational
freedom.”108
Foreshadowing the Court’s rationale, the ACLU argued that the Jaycees’s
freedom of association was only minimally impacted by having to admit
women to full membership.109 It argued that, in reaching a contrary
conclusion, the Eighth Circuit impermissibly engaged in “sex stereotyping”
and advanced an “unsupported hypothesis” that the “systemic relegation” of
female Jaycees members to “inferior roles” within the Jaycees was necessary
to the organization’s expression and advocacy.110 By doing so, the Eighth
Circuit wielded “the traditional shield of freedom of association” as a sword
against “excluded or subordinated groups,” which the U.S. Supreme Court
had expressly held was impermissible even if protected ideas about
“exclusionary practices” were involved.111
In deploying this shield-to-sword image, appellants and their amici
repeatedly invoked Norwood and Runyon, in which the Court rejected the
argument that “[t]he practice of racial segregation . . . was sheltered as a form
of constitutionally protected association.”112 They reminded the Court that
“[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”113

106. Brief for the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants,
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
232, at *30–31.
107. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union and Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union in Support of Appellants, Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 229, at *13 [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of ACLU].
108. Id. at *9.
109. Id. at *13–14; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
110. Brief Amicus Curiae of ACLU, supra note 107, at *15.
111. Id. at *6–7.
112. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *24–25 (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 470 (1973)).
113. Id. at *25 (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470).
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B. The Harms to Women from Unequal Access to the Marketplace—
and to Jaycees Membership
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Minnesota’s interest was not
sufficiently compelling to override the infringement on the Jaycees’s
associational rights given that, among other things, the record did not show
that “membership in the Jaycees was the only practicable way for a woman
to advance herself in business or professional life.”114 On appeal, the
appellants and their amici argued that the Eighth Circuit failed to apply the
proper test and to appreciate the nature and extent of the harm that women
experienced from that unequal membership structure. This section highlights
both the analogies drawn between race and sex discrimination and the more
gender-specific argument about the significance of the Jaycees (as part of the
old boys network) as an avenue to professional success.
1. The Jaycees: This Is a Case of “Relatively Minor Impediments”
The Jaycees argued that the record on appeal did not support its “alleged
exalted status in the power structure of American society” and that “[t]here
is no evidence from which to conclude that Jaycee membership is the sine
qua non of employment, promotion or ability to make potentially useful
business contacts by men or women.”115 It painted a picture of the “virtually
unlimited” ability of “women to make valuable contacts with other men and
women” and have leadership experience in a myriad of organizations,
including all-female ones.116 Amicus Boy Scouts of America (BSA)
concurred that Minnesota’s interest aimed at “relatively minor impediments
to a person’s desire for economic advancement or social recognition”; it
could show “no more than that one of many possible means to a particular
objective may be obstructed.”117
2. Appellants: The Importance of Access
While the Jaycees and their amici challenged the significance of regular
membership in the Jaycees for women’s economic advancement, appellants
and their amici situated the Jaycees in the context of a broader network of
associations to which women had unequal (or no) access. In stressing the
harm to women from this inequality, they turned to the language of secondclass citizenship and to analogies between race- and sex-based exclusion.

114. U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1573 (8th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
115. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, supra note 94, at *47.
116. Id. at *48.
117. Brief of the Boy Scouts of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance,
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
234, at *42.
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a. Exclusion from the “Old Boys Network”
Disagreeing with BSA, NOW put it bluntly: one of the “most important
services provided to [the Jaycees’s] members” is “an entree to the ‘Old Boys
Network.’”118 As NOW explained:
The Old Boys Network is that series of linkages with influential elders,
ambitious peers and younger men on their way up which men develop as
they move through school, work, professional and community service
organizations, and private clubs. It provides men with knowledgeable
allies who help them to advance in their careers, teach them who the cast
of characters is and how to behave in a new position, and assist them in
getting the earliest news of job openings, business opportunities and
financial grants.119

NOW asserted that “[t]he importance of access to such a network cannot be
overestimated,” citing a variety of sources confirming the critical role of
networking to corporate advancement and of the “Old Boys Network” as a
vital “power source” for men’s job advancement.120
In arguing that women would benefit as much from these networks as men,
NOW made a series of “sameness” arguments about the “growing
convergence in men’s and women’s career and family goals” and the
importance of mentorship for success for both men and women.121
Prefiguring arguments decades later about why so few women in the pipeline
make it to top management, NOW reported that a study of male and female
college graduates from the classes of 1969 to 1972 “revealed that [they]
chose the same types of jobs upon graduation” and that “there was no
evidence that women work fewer hours or drop out of the labor force due to
marriage or childbirth, explanations often given for the small representation
of women in the ranks of management.”122 Instead, there was a “strong
correlation between mentoring and success for women” and, likewise, a
strong correlation between lack of mentoring and low success.123
New York and California, as amici, also emphasized the significance of
full membership in groups like the Jaycees: “There is hardly a more
important area of state concern than furtherance of the opportunities of all
citizens to participate in educational, business and civic associations.”124
They explained that, because “the systematic exclusion of women” from such
organizations has impeded their “full participation . . . in our society,” New
York and California, by aggressively enforcing their antidiscrimination laws
118. Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW, supra note 36, at *19.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *19–21.
121. Id. at *21–22 (citing results of “numerous studies of college students” on converging
interests and a Wellesley College Center for Research on Women report on the critical role of
mentoring to success).
122. Id. at *22.
123. Id. at *22–23.
124. Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of New York, Joined by the State of California in
Support of Reversal, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 230, at *21.

2019]

MALE CHAUVINISM UNDER ATTACK

2403

and policies, “are firmly committed to altering this historical reality by
requiring organizations which provide traditional avenues of professional
advancement and community involvement to provide equal access to men
and women.”125 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit “greatly undervalued”
Minnesota’s interest, and the dissent correctly identified states’ “compelling
interest in eradicating second-class citizenship in places of public
accommodation.”126 In arguing that “allowing female citizens full and equal
access to places of accommodation” was of utmost societal importance, the
states observed that, when the New York State Legislature added “sex” to its
public accommodations law in 1976, it found that “the failure to provide
equal opportunity” posed a menace to a “free democratic state.”127
Amici offered concrete examples of how the Jaycees offered unique
opportunities for professional development. In those local chapters where
women enjoyed full membership, female Jaycees members testified to
receiving promotions at work because of their involvement.128 Ms. Kathleen
Hawn testified that her experience on the Jaycees board of directors
developed her speaking and organization skills.129 Appellants, the
Minnesota officials, also stressed the benefit of women and men working
together as equals in a business setting.130 By comparison, they asserted, the
inequality in Jaycees chapters that did not admit women to full membership
reinforced stereotypes of men as leaders and women as followers:
The Jaycees portrays itself as a breeding ground for tomorrow’s leaders. If
the state has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination, it has an
equal interest in ensuring that the formative experiences of future leaders
include men and women working as equals on projects of leadership,
development, community service, and civic betterment such as are engaged
in by the Jaycees. Jaycees’ by-laws which relegate women to followers and
elevate men to leaders solely on the basis of an immutable characteristic
are antithetical to that interest.131

NOW argued that this hierarchical membership structure created a
“‘together but unequal’ environment with many serious disadvantages to the
second-class participants.”132 On one hand, it “create[d] feelings of
inferiority in women,” while, on the other, it “reinforce[d] the handmaiden
mentality in men—the notion that women are always the Women’s
Auxiliary, there to serve without praise or pay.”133 The NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund similarly elaborated that excluding women
from “informal centers of power” represented by all-male organizations like
125. Id. at *4.
126. Id. at *19.
127. Id.
128. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for Community Business
Leaders as Amicus Curiae at 15, Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (No. 83-724).
129. Id. at 16.
130. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *40 n.15.
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW, supra note 36, at *27.
133. Id. at *27–28.
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the Jaycees reinforces perceptions of business as a masculine activity,
substantiates harmful prejudices, inhibits women’s ability to succeed in
business, and limits the aspirations of future generations.134
b. Race-Sex Analogies
While appellants and their amici asserted gender-specific harms resulting
from exclusion from full membership in the Jaycees as part of the old boys
network, they also drew upon race-based analogies to emphasize the
wrongness of unequal membership within the organization. Appellants and
their amici argued that the analogy between the harms of racial and sex
discrimination in the market was strong, as was the government’s interest in
each instance:
Equality of access to the market place for women is a significant state
interest. No one can seriously dispute that “the deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments” is not felt as deeply by women so treated as by persons
accorded it on the basis of color.135

As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Jaycees
would contain the same analogy and historical reference.136 The appellants
drew on potent images of repudiated racial segregation in urging the Supreme
Court to reject the Eighth Circuit’s finding that Minnesota had failed to
demonstrate a compelling state interest because it did not show “that
membership in the Jaycees was the only practicable way for a woman to
advance herself in business or professional life.”137 Not only was this an
overly narrow view of the state’s interest in ensuring equal access to
commercial activities regardless of race, sex, or ethnicity, but it was based
upon the rejected theory of “separate but equal.” Appellants urged the Court
not to allow women to be deprived of equal opportunity by a failed
justification for racial inequality properly assigned to “the constitutional
graveyard.”138
In its statement of interest, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund asserted the similarity between the kind of discrimination experienced
by racial minorities and women in private organizations and clubs:
“Discrimination against women among private organizations and clubs rests
on the same ill-founded claims that are offered to defend racial discrimination
in the same kinds of institutions.”139

134. Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 228, at *12 [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP LDF].
135. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *36 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)).
136. See supra Part I.
137. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *39–40.
138. Id. at *41.
139. Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP LDF, supra note 134, at *2.
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Other amici enlisted the Court’s race-discrimination precedents and its
Equal Protection sex-discrimination precedents to label the Jaycees’s
discriminatory membership as “invidious” and counter the Jaycees’s
argument that it was a “single gender” organization whose freedom of
association would be violated by admitting women.140 The Alliance for
Women’s Membership argued that it was the women excluded from full
membership who were being denied freedom of association because of the
toll taken by such “invidious discrimination.”141 After critiquing the unequal
access to opportunities for female Jaycees members, the Alliance added:
“Women may be confined to the back of the Jaycees bus, but they are fully
associated in every way with the Jaycees organization.”142
C. Debating Whether Admitting Women as Full Members Will
Harm the Jaycees
A third debated issue was whether the Jaycees would be harmed by
admitting women to full, rather than associate, membership. Answering that
question partly turned on whether the Jaycees was truly a “men’s
organization” with purposes unique to the advancement of young men’s
interests and rooted in ideas about gender difference and the desire for allmale or all-female associations. The issue also arose at oral argument, in
which the justices debated whether a group need be committed to the cause
of “male chauvinism” to be harmed by admitting women as full members.143
1. The Jaycees and Their Amici Defend Advancing
the “Interests of Young Men Only”
The Jaycees contended that compliance with Minnesota’s public
accommodations law—requiring it to serve the interests of young women,
along with those of young men—would destroy the organization’s ability to
achieve its “core purpose”: “to provide young men with an opportunity for
personal development and achievement through participation in the affairs of
their community, state and nation.”144 They argued that the organization
serves as a spokesman—a “representative voice”—for young men and
speaks out on controversial issues.145 The Jaycees warned that a ruling
140. Amicus Brief of Alliance for Women Membership in Support of Appellants, Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 231,
at *6–10 (first citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1972); then citing Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974)).
141. Id. at *6–9. The Alliance quotes one female “associate” member: “It would be like
being allowed to go into a restaurant and being able to sit at a table with somebody else, but
not being able to order or eat.” Id. at *10.
142. Id. at *3.
143. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at
42–43, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/transcripts/1983/83-724_04-18-1984.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RK3D-KT9C] [hereinafter Official Transcript]; infra Part III.C.3.
144. Brief of Appellee, the United States Jaycees, supra note 94, at *14.
145. Id.
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against them would destroy the associational purposes and freedoms of a
wide range of groups. For example, “all-female groups may be forced to
serve the interests of men” and “all-Black groups may be compelled to take
on the burden of serving the special interest of white people,” not to mention
the toll taken on various “racially, religiously and ethnically restricted
associations.”146 Invoking Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic comment about
the propensity of Americans to form a myriad of associations, the Jaycees
contended that Minnesota “[sought] a rule of constitutional law which would
stifle this pluralism in the name of a misbegotten concept of
egalitarianism.”147 Rotary similarly appealed to pluralism: “The State of
Minnesota seeks to compel homogeneity which is the antithesis of freedom
of association and runs counter to the pluralism which is one of America’s
strengths.”148
With another nod to de Tocqueville, the BSA denied that Minnesota had a
sufficiently compelling interest to intrude on freedom of association—a
“pillar of our pluralistic society” and a bulwark differentiating “our society
from totalitarian regimes.”149 Having seen its own membership policies
excluding “homosexuals or women from certain leadership positions”
successfully challenged in court under some other states’ public
accommodations laws, the BSA urged the Court not to adopt such a “stunted
concept of the nature and scope of associational freedom.”150
The brief of the Conference of Private Organizations turned to gender
difference and “like seeking like” to deny that the Jaycees accorded women
second-class membership status. It argued that many “[f]raternals, social
clubs, and civic and service organizations . . . sponsor specific programs
open to the general public,” and those allowed to participate did not become
“second class” members by doing so.151 Further, “sponsorship of such
programs should not destroy [the groups’] right to maintain their restrictedclass membership policies for strictly member functions.”152 Beliefs in
gender differences and gender complementarity, it asserted, explain the
parallel existence of fraternal societies by “working men” and women’s (and
sometimes children’s) auxiliaries:
[S]uch [fraternal] associations have generally been limited to men.
However, similar sororal societies, based on a like spirit of kinship,
146. Id. at *19, *21.
147. Id. at *21.
148. Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International, supra note 37, at *25. Rotary also
argued that, although Minnesota “believes sex discrimination in private associations to be
harmful to women, if not to the entire citizenry of the State,” this interest is not a compelling
interest that would justify “abolish[ing] all private discriminatory organizations.” Id. at *30–
33.
149. Brief of the Boy Scouts of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, supra
note 117, at *7–8, *16–17.
150. Id. at *7.
151. Brief of Conference of Private Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Affirmance, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), 1984 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 225, at *23–24.
152. Id. at *24.
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sociability and mutuality, and carrying out comparable, but distinct,
benevolent, social and philanthropic programs, exist for women.
Social clubs also depend heavily on common bonds among members to
achieve their purposes. . . . Because men and women members often
perceive that they have different interests and objectives, club membership
is frequently all-male or all-female. Class restrictions of this type are often
thought to be essential for achieving the goals of a social club . . . .153

The Conference insisted that those who adhere to this view of gender deserve
protection even if “times have changed” and this view is “undoubtedly less
universal that it once was”:
However foolish it may seem to some, it is widely believed by members of
some fraternals and clubs that the roles of men and women in society are
different, and that the organizations through which men and women strive
for personal development should reflect that difference. . . . [T]hat
philosophy still plays an important role in the lives of millions of
“traditional” families. [It] inspires such . . . clubs to provide civic, public,
eleemosynary and social benefits which contribute significantly to the
common weal. The expression and practice of this philosophy . . . are as
deserving of protection under the freedom of association guarantee as the
communications activities of such organizations.154

To establish the legitimacy of single-gender organizations, the Conference
cited Congress’ chartering of the BSA and the Girl Scouts of America.155
Although Minnesota’s public accommodations law clearly excluded
private clubs, the Conference segued to the Jaycees: the Jaycees’s “positions
are inherently a product of the common bond among the members, which
includes the restrictions on voting, policymaking and leadership by certain
age groups and by women.”156
2. Disputing that the Jaycees Was Truly a “Men’s Organization”
Appellants and their amici argued that admitting women to full
membership would not impair the Jaycees’s organizational goals, a theme
later sounded in the Court’s majority opinion. NOW argued that the
Jaycees’s admission of women as associate members was evidence that it
was “not in fact the men’s organization that it purports to be.”157 Further,
the “‘Jaycee Creed’ . . . contains nothing that espouses discrimination on the
basis of sex” and “nothing that the Jaycees does . . . is uniquely related to the
interest of men.”158 NOW urged the Court to reject the Jaycees’s argument
that a ruling in favor of Minnesota raised “the specter of Minnesota’s
invading all kinds of membership organizations, from B’nai Brith to the
Polish Women’s Alliance.”159 Instead, to insist that the Jaycees “eliminate
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at *27–28.
Id. at *28–29.
Id. at *29.
Id. at *29–30.
Brief Amicus Curiae of NOW, supra note 36, at *44–45.
Id. at *39, *45.
Id. at *44.
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women’s second class status” within its organization neither “drastically
alters” the Jaycees’s nature, nor “threatens the identity of other truly
homogenous groups.”160
Once again, analogies to race-discrimination precedents in which the
Court rejected freedom of association claims played a part. The appellants
asserted that, as in Runyon, “the record does not show that the advocacy by
the Jaycees of any of its beliefs, or indeed its exercise of any other first
amendment freedom, would be impaired by giving women full membership
rights.”161 “Allowing women to vote, hold office, and receive awards,” the
brief insisted, “will . . . change nothing about the organization except its
sexually restrictive nature.”162
3. The Oral Argument: Was the Jaycees “an Organization
of Male Chauvinists”?
At the oral argument, the justices pressed counsel for the Jaycees about the
claim that admitting women to full membership would injure the Jaycees’s
purpose. Counsel Carl D. Hall, Jr. argued that it is “only rational to assume
that” an organization “dedicated to voting the interests of men” would
“undergo a substantial change” if it admitted women.163 Chief Justice
William Rehnquist countered that it seemed that it would “depend on the
nature of the organization.”164 He illustrated his point with a hypothetical
“organization of all male stockbrokers that are concerned solely with the
business of stockbrokering.”165 He noted that there are minimal differences
between men and women in the focus on stockbroking, such that requiring
female admission would not significantly impact the organization’s
purpose.166 Conversely, Chief Justice Rehnquist posited:
[I]f you have an organization of male chauvinists that says we’re tired of
this affirmative action in favor of women, we want what we think is a
square deal, it seems to me there you get a different thing.
But you haven’t really shown that the Jaycees are in the latter category
at all, that they espouse anything close to men’s rights or the kind of issues
that men and women might feel differently about.167

Hall answered by repeating that, similar to women’s organizations whose
core purposes were to advance women, the Jaycees’s main purpose was to
advance the interests of young men.168 He continued by arguing that, just as
160. Id. at *45.
161. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 100, at *31–32.
162. Id. at *34.
163. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 42; Oral Argument at 46:34, Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (No. 83-724), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-724
[https://perma.cc/4VHK-K7CM].
164. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 42; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 46:51.
165. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 42; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 46:51.
166. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 42; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 46:51.
167. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 42–43; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at
47:16.
168. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 43; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 47:49.
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such women’s organizations would change by admitting men, so too would
the Jaycees.169 When Rehnquist later asked if there was a relevant distinction
between the Jaycees and a hypothetical “National Organization of Men, that
[is] anti-affirmative action, anti-ERA, and so forth,” Hall answered: “It
seems irrational to assume that this organization, to continue as an all-male
organization, has to deliberately take positions on ERA or abortion in order
to show how anti-woman it is.”170 Hall once again pointed out that “allwomen organizations” are “accepted”; so too, he argued should be “all-male
organization[s].”171 Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out that organizations
to which Hall pointed, such as NOW, had women and men among their
members.172
In an exchange that made the newspapers, Justice Thurgood Marshall
asked, “Aren’t you just afraid that the women will ‘take over’?” Hall
conceded that this “may be a possible fear” but that “it’s the kind of fear that
would be legitimately protected by any group.”173 Justice Byron White
pressed the issue, observing that, while Hall asserted that the Jaycees’s
purpose was to promote the interests of young men, none of the Jaycees’s
public positions could be identified as promoting such interests “as
distinguished from young women.”174 Hall shifted gears by arguing that
taking positions on issues is only “one part of the way in which young men
are developed”; others include “running projects” that benefit the
community.175 To that, Justice Stevens observed that if such projects are
“designed to teach [men] to be good, effective executives,” then would not
women “learn exactly the same way”?176 Hall admitted that women, as
associate members, did participate in such programs, but they could not vote,
control policy, or hold office.177 This led Justice Marshall to quip: “Well,
tell me, what other right do they have, other than to pay their dues?”178
Also reported was the questioning pursued by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor—then the only female justice on the Court—about the analogy to
race-based refusals of service in public accommodations. When Hall
invoked Supreme Court privacy precedents,179 Justice O’Connor observed
that there were “businesses that said we don’t want to serve blacks,” but “this
169. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 43; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 47:49.
170. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 49–50; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at
54:47.
171. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 42–43; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at
55:35.
172. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 53; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 59:30.
173. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 43–44; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at
48:34; see also Fred Barbash, Minnesota Argues in Supreme Court to End U.S. Jaycees’ MenOnly Rule, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1984, at A2.
174. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 54–55; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at
50:44.
175. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 55; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 51:09.
176. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 56; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 51:40.
177. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 56–57; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at
52:11.
178. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 57; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 52:37.
179. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Court has said that the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination is enough
to put a stop to that.”180 When Hall tried to distinguish the “private
associational characteristics” of the Jaycees from “sharing a plate of food in
a restaurant,” Justice O’Connor retorted: “Don’t you think those were the
arguments that were made in those cases?”181
D. The Supreme Court Rules
It is worth reiterating that both the Court’s majority opinion and Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Jaycees have proven to be treasure troves of
nuggets enlisted to support freedom of association182 and the basic
legitimacy and compelling nature of the government’s interest in
“eradicating discrimination against its female citizens” as well as, by
analogy, other marginalized populations.183 The Court accepted Minnesota’s
“functional definition” of public accommodations184 to reach groups like the
Jaycees because “leadership skills are ‘goods’ [and] business contacts and
employment promotions are ‘privileges’ and ‘advantages,’”185 such that the
state has a compelling interest in ensuring that women have equal access to
such goods, privileges, and advantages.186
The Court included NAACP v. Alabama among its many precedents
establishing that “certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role
in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs” and, in so doing, “foster diversity and act as critical
buffers between the individual and the power of the State.”187 The Jaycees
chapters, “large and basically unselective groups,” “clearly” fell outside of
this category of “relationships worthy of this kind of constitutional
protection.”188
The Court elaborated on the freedom of association for purposes of
political expression: “According protection to collective effort on behalf of
shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural
diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the
majority.”189 In its majority opinion, the Court concluded that some of the
Jaycees’s activities implicated this right but added that the right was not

180. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 51; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 57:18;
see also Barbash, supra note 173, at A2.
181. Official Transcript, supra note 143, at 52; Oral Argument, supra note 163, at 58:00.
182. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“There can be no clearer
example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire.”).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 625.
185. Id. at 626 (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1981)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 618–19.
188. Id. at 620–21.
189. Id. at 622 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). Recall that the
appellants and their amici emphasized this shielding function as a reason why the Jaycees’s
reliance on NAACP v. Alabama was unpersuasive. See supra Part III.A.2.
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absolute and could be infringed to “serve compelling state interests.”190
Minnesota, the Court concluded, had such an interest: its public
accommodations law “reflects the State’s strong historical commitment to
eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services. That goal, which is unrelated to the
suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the
highest order.”191
The Court, unlike the Eighth Circuit, did not require Minnesota to establish
that full membership in the Jaycees was the only route to professional
advancement. Notably, in reiterating that Minnesota’s law “protects the
State’s citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms,” the
majority raised the concern over stereotyping and its impact on dignity in its
own Equal Protection jurisprudence:
[T]his Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes
forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no
relationship to their actual abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of
their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation
in political, economic, and cultural life.192

Concern over stereotyping also played a role in one of the most
controversial parts of the majority opinion. The Court concluded there was
“no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting
members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in protected [First
Amendment] activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”193 The Court
argued that Minnesota’s law “requires no change in the Jaycees’s creed of
promoting the interest of young men” or any restriction on excluding
members who do not share the Jaycees’s “ideologies or philosophies.”194
Indeed, the Court stated that, in arguing that women might differ on some
of the issues on which the Jaycees had expressed a position (such as “the
federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations”), the
Jaycees “relie[d] solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative
interests and perspectives of men and women.”195 Without a more
substantial showing, the Court “decline[d] to indulge in the sexual
stereotyping” underlying the Jaycees’s contention that if women were
permitted to vote, it would “change the content or impact of the
organization’s speech.”196 Citing Hishon v. King & Spalding,197 the Jaycees
majority stated that the Jaycees “failed to demonstrate that [Minnesota’s law]
190. Jaycees, 468 U.S at 623.
191. Id. at 624 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 625.
193. Id. at 627. For such criticisms, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
194. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627.
195. Id. at 627–28.
196. Id. at 628.
197. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). In Hishon, the Court rejected a freedom of association claim
brought by a law firm in response to a sex-discrimination suit brought by a female associate
who was not promoted to partner. Id. at 78.
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imposed any serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of expressive
association.”198
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is an equally rich source for statements in
support of state antidiscrimination law.199 But O’Connor eschews the
majority’s inquiry into whether an organization’s expression will be
altered.200 Instead, she urged a line-drawing test between “expressive
associations” and “commercial associations.”201 Based on the record, she
concluded the Jaycees chapters presented a “relatively easy case” for
applying this dichotomy: they fall on the commercial side.202 Their basic
activities—recruiting members and selling membership as a “product”—are
commercial.203
IV. WHITHER THE “OLD BOYS NETWORK” TODAY? OLD AND NEW
CHALLENGES
In this final Part, I discuss the immediate impact of the Court’s decision
on the U.S. Jaycees and its local chapters, drawing on newspaper accounts.
I observe that concerns over the problem of the old boys network are not just
a thing of the past, as efforts to counter effects of such networks with womancentered networks indicate. I identify some remaining challenges at the
intersection of freedom of association and freedom from discrimination.
A. The Immediate Aftermath of Jaycees
In its Jaycees opinion, the Court noted that, in 1981, the Jaycees “had
approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters affiliated with 51
state organizations” and “about 11,915 associate members.”204 Women
associate members accounted for 2 percent of total membership.205 On
August 16, 1984, about one month after the Court’s ruling, U.S. Jaycees
“overwhelmingly approved a resolution allowing women full
membership.”206 The Jaycees’s president, Tommy Todd, stated that the
organization was “in no way compelled to do this” but instead it was “an
‘opportune time’ to set ‘a direction for others to follow.’”207 However,
another Jaycees official observed that thirty-seven states, like Minnesota,

198. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 626 (citing Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78).
199. Id. at 634, 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that “[a] shopkeeper has no
constitutional right to deal only with persons of one sex” and “[a]n association must choose
its market”).
200. Id. at 632.
201. Id. at 632–37.
202. Id. at 638–39.
203. Id. at 639–40.
204. Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
205. Id.
206. Jaycees Vote to Admit Women to Membership, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1984, at A8.
207. Id.
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included “sex” in their public accommodations laws, and so: “If we vote
against this, we’re sued into oblivion.”208
News coverage after this vote included pictures of smiling and laughing
women and men together as the former were sworn in to full membership in
various Jaycees chapters or toasted by their male colleagues.209 Some
chapters admitted women grudgingly, while some chose to disband rather
than admit women. As the president of the disbanded Zilwaukee, Michigan,
chapter explained: “I like a night out with the guys after the work’s done.”210
In contrast, some local chapters that had “been quietly admitting women” as
full members for some time could now do so openly.211 Some news stories
pondered the fate of the local chapters of the all-female U.S. Jaycee Women,
which had been formed by the Jaycees in the 1970s to make women’s
presence official: would they disband all-women organizations and form
newly integrated chapters or would they continue, but with full membership
privileges?212 Reprising some of the themes in the briefs, Phyllis Marron,
president of the Prince George’s Jaycee Women, reported that “[s]ome
women prefer to participate in an-all women’s group.”213 Notably, one
reason she gave was that the chapters did programming around “women’s
health issues as well as on rape, battered wives, self-protection and jobrelated stress”—and “[a] lot of women feel more comfortable discussing
these topics with women only.”214 Other media stories debated the merits of
all-female networking groups, or whether membership in groups like the
Jaycees was needed to break into the “‘old boy network,’ which can lead to
career advancement.”215
Less than one year later, this debate became moot. The U.S. Jaycee
Women decided to disband “because most of the group’s members have
joined the formerly all-male Jaycees.”216 Echoing the words of the Jaycees’s
president on the resolution to admit women, the president of U.S. Jaycee
Women, Doris Gosnell, said that “[o]ur time is changing” and that the
group’s leadership was recommending to its membership that “they begin the
process of moving into the Jaycees framework.”217
208. Id. (quoting Mr. Barclay Clark of the Pueblo, Colorado, Jaycees chapter, who voted
against the resolution).
209. See, e.g., Diana Griego, Orange County Chapters Receptive to National Order:
Women Welcomed as Jaycees Members, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1984, at A5; Charles Hillinger
& Tom Gorman, Meeting Marks End of Jaycees’ Ban on Women, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1984,
at B3.
210. James Barron, Some Units of Jaycees Rebel Against Admitting Women, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1984, at A14.
211. Tom Gorman & Charles Hillinger, San Diego’s Way Ahead of the Game: State
Jaycees Add Women in Wake of Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1984, at A1.
212. Harriet L. Blake, Area Women Begin Joining Jaycees as Full Members, WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 1984.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Doug Brown, New Approach to Networking: Professional Men, Women Exchange
Ideas at Meetings, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1984, at D1.
216. Jaycee Women to Disband, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1985, at A18.
217. Id.
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B. Remaining Challenges at the Intersection of Freedom of Association
and Freedom from Discrimination
Today, the Jaycees are not as prominent in the United States as they were
in the 1980s.218 Existing chapters describe their purpose in gender-neutral
terms: providing “civic service” and “growing the skills of our members and
providing an opportunity to make lifelong friendships.”219 Nonetheless,
although the Jaycees is no longer a central symbol of the old boys network,
the term has by no means been retired. Like most public accommodations
laws, Minnesota’s law excluded truly private clubs.220 At the time of the
Jaycees decision, news coverage reported that feminists were taking aim at
all-male clubs’ discriminatory policies because of the role of such clubs in
advancing careers.221
Over three decades later, some argue that all-male social clubs remain an
important social network from which professional women are excluded.222
The term “old boys network” has appeared in recent news reports about male
clients’ strong preference for male attorneys to lead their cases as well as the
obstacles women running for public office encounter.223 In response, one
trend is to form women-centered networks to help women give and get peer
mentorship, empower women in the workplace, and, as it were, “replicate the
old boys club.”224

218. There are currently 12,000 Jaycees with 584 chapters (with no gender breakdown of
membership provided). About Us, JCI USA, https://jciusa.org/about-us/ [http://perma.cc/
WN8E-YKU3] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
219. See, e.g., Who Are the Foxboro Jaycees?, FOXBORO JAYCEES,
http://www.foxborojaycees.org/?page_id=752 [https://perma.cc/HP7E-C8HX] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2019).
220. See U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1981) (stating that private
organizations are beyond the scope of the state’s public accommodations law).
221. Dan Morain, Next Target: Sex Bias in Men’s Clubs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1985, at
A1 (reporting that law professor Herma Hill Kay described lawsuits against men’s clubs as “a
second generation of sex discrimination cases”).
222. See, e.g., Liz Elting, How to Navigate a Boys’ Club Culture, FORBES (July 27, 2018,
4:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizelting/2018/07/27/how-to-navigate-a-boys-clubculture [https://perma.cc/PT5H-LXQL].
223. Eliza Collins, Trump Prompts Dem Women to Run for Congress in Pa., but They Face
‘Old Boys Network,’ USA TODAY (Apr. 18, 2018, 12:34 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2018/04/18/pennsylvania-democratic-women-running-after-trump-stillboys-network/524157002 [https://perma.cc/2E25-554U]; Kathryn Rubino, The Old Boys
Network Is as Strong as Ever—Study Finds Male Clients Prefer Male Attorneys, ABOVE L.
(Jan. 19, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/01/the-old-boys-network-is-asstrong-as-ever-study-finds-male-clients-prefer-male-attorneys [http://perma.cc/Z7XH-PE2S]
(“[I]n only 17 percent of cases do male clients choose a female attorney to lead their matter—
that’s a third less than the incidence of female clients selecting female attorneys to lead their
projects.”).
224. Rina Raphael, Millennial Women’s Business Conferences: Safe Spaces or Pink Silo?,
FAST COMPANY (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40536521/millennialwomens-business-conferences-safe-space-or-pink-silo [https://perma.cc/MS2N-7ZHT]; Rina
Raphael, This New Private Network for Women Execs Looks to Replicate the Old Boys’ Club,
FAST COMPANY (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90290926/chief-the-boysclub-for-c-suite-women-launches-today [https://perma.cc/PFV4-H3NV].
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In 2018, the annual Women in the Workplace report found that, despite
four years of verbal commitments to gender diversity, companies had not
made meaningful progress.225 The report asserts that “[w]omen are doing
their part”: “They’ve been earning more bachelor’s degrees than men for
decades. They’re asking for promotions and negotiating salaries at the same
rates as men.”226 Additionally, in an echo of NOW’s brief in Jaycees,
“contrary to conventional wisdom, they are staying in the workforce at the
same rate as men.”227 Yet they do not progress to top leadership positions
within corporations.228 The report noted the path was even steeper and more
stalled for women of color and lesbian women.229 Without explicitly
mentioning the “old boys network,” the report mentioned various ways that
women, especially women of color, received less support from managers
than men do and were “more likely to say they never have informal
interactions with senior leaders, such as casual conversations or lunch
meetings,” or socialize with them outside of work.230 The vocabulary of
gender and race discrimination is more sophisticated than it was at the time
of Jaycees (e.g., the “microagressions” of “everyday sexism and racism”231),
but such discrimination continues to hinder gender equality in the workplace
and other spheres.
Are single-sex or single-gender organizations an anachronism or do they
have a significant role in furthering values protected by freedom of
association? Are such organizations particularly important to women and
racial minorities when gender and race discrimination persists? Might they
advance, rather than hinder, freedom from discrimination? I leave full
discussion for another day, but note two recent developments that raise these
questions. First, in 2017, the Boy Scouts of America, an amicus for the
Jaycees, announced that it would admit girls into its Cub Scout program and,
by February 2019, into all ranks of scouting; its new name would be Scouts
BSA.232 The leaders of the Girl Scouts cautioned against “reckless” thinking
that the BSA could easily translate for girls a program “specifically tailored
to boys” and appealed to research that girls learn scouting best in an all-
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female environment.233 Stressing problems of sexual abuse within the BSA,
they questioned how it could “credibly claim” it could create a “safe space”
for girls.234
Sharp conflict over the value and place for single-gender organizations on
college campuses is another example. At Yale, female students have brought
a class action alleging that Yale lags behind peers like Harvard in
discouraging students from joining single-sex clubs and that Yale has turned
a “blind eye” to the alcohol consumption, sexual harassment, and sexual
assault connected with fraternities.235 Reminiscent of NOW’s argument in
Jaycees, the plaintiffs also argue all-male fraternities exclude them from
valuable social networks helpful for future employment and mentoring.236
Meanwhile, at Harvard, where concern over campus sexual assault in allmale clubs spurred policies directed at all students who join single-sex clubs,
fraternities, and sororities, such groups have fought back, alleging sex
discrimination and “associational discrimination.”237 The complaint also
speaks of women’s loss, through Harvard’s policy, of the “tremendous value”
of sorority membership as a source of resources, networks, knowledge, and
connections and of women’s groups being “collateral damage” in the cause
of purportedly protecting women from men.238 This complaint squarely
raises the issue of whether such spaces continue to be necessary and
empowering or are an anachronism in the twenty-first century.239

233. Tasneem Nashrulla, The Girls Scouts Have Accused the Boy Scouts of Secretly Trying
to Recruit Girls to Appeal to Millennial Parents, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tasneemnashrulla/girl-scouts-letter-to-boy-scouts
[https://perma.cc/TGZ4-WZ4D]; Derek M. Norman, New Kind of Recruit for Rebranded Boy
Scouts: Girls, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/nyregion/
girls-in-boy-scouts-bsa.html [http://perma.cc/NA4F-DS88].
234. Charles Garcia, Girl Scouts Board Member: Boy Scouts Must First Fix Their
Problems, TIME (Oct. 13, 2017), http://time.com/4982249/boy-scouts-should-not-admit-girls/
[http://perma.cc/4MZ3-CWKN].
235. Anemona Hartocollis, Three Women Sue Yale, Saying Fraternity Scene Is Enabling
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/us/yalefraternities.html [http://perma.cc/M2PY-7WWS].
236. Evan Gerstmann, Understanding the Dueling Lawsuits Against Yale and Harvard
over Fraternities and Sororities, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/evangerstmann/2019/02/19/understanding-the-dueling-lawsuits-against-yale-andharvard-over-fraternities-and-sororities/ [http://perma.cc/HCX6-P4VN].
237. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 65, Kappa Alpha Theta Fraternity,
Inc. v. Harvard Univ., No. 1:18-cv-12485 (D. Mass Dec. 3, 2018), ECF No. 1. The
associational discrimination claims arise under Title IX and Massachusetts law, not the First
Amendment, since Harvard is a private university. See id. at 65–66, 70–71.
238. Id. at 3–4, 61.
239. Patricia Hurtado & Janelle Lawrence, Harvard Is Sued by Greek Houses over SingleSex Penalties, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-12-03/harvard-sued-by-sororities-and-fraternities-claiming-bias
[https://perma.cc/NJC3-FAVB].

